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On the Focus Imaginarius of the Nascent Global Society and Contemporary Social Theory: 
What is the Status and Role of the Idea of Harmony? 
 
Piet Strydom 
 
Abstract 
This article offers a theoretical assessment of the idea of harmony as a potential focus 
imaginarius for the construction and organisation of the emerging global society as well for 
the social scientific study of this process. The assessment is couched in cognitive social-
theoretical terms. While the limits of the idea of harmony are highlighted by drawing on 
aesthetic theory, it is nevertheless retained as an essential formal presupposition possessing 
both ontological and epistemological significance. Social-scientifically, however, the idea is 
located on the meta-level, counterfactual, cognitive order of society as only one among a 
wide range of different cognitive suppositions which get selectively and variably combined 
and used as structuring elements when distinct actor-agents in concrete social life 
competitively engage in the pursuit of their own particular visions of a harmonious society. 
The task today is to study this process in order to identify learning processes and potentials 
pointing toward a harmonious society that could be social-scientifically enhanced and 
supported. 
 
Key words: aesthetics, cognitive order, global society, learning processes, social theory, 
triple contingency 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A small number of epoch-making events have shaped the late twentieth and early twenty-
first century experience of the human form of life as being caught in the pincers of a 
multidimensional crisis implicating our sense of both earth and world (Strydom 2011a). They 
include the dropping of the atom bomb on Japan which stimulated the acknowledgement of 
the risks produced by the experimenting science-technology-capitalist-industrial society; 
second, the official registering of the ecological crisis and the need for a healthcare system 
for the earth; third, the process of globalisation with its disruptive and even destructive 
consequences; and, finally, the emergence of the so-called ‘new world order’ after 1989 
with its contradictory imperialist, nationalist and cosmopolitan implications. Accordingly, a 
select few ideas have become elaborated as cultural models and acquired the status of the 
most potent leading imaginaries guiding and giving direction to concerted efforts to 
transform the current human form of life into a form of global cosmopolitan existence in a 
cared-for planetary biosocial ecosphere – namely, peace, ecologism, human rights and 
cosmopolitanism. 
 
It comes as no surprise that in this context of a nascent global society exhibiting a gravely 
fraught and disjointed state such ideas as ‘harmony’ and ‘transformative harmony’ (Giri 
2012) arise. The question is, however, whether the idea of harmony can effectively function 
as a leading light or lodestar directing, guiding and regulating the desired transformation of 
the construction, direction of development and organisation of the contemporary social 
formation and its relation to both its individual members and the organic foundations of life. 
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In social theory, there is a long tradition of conceiving society in some way or other, 
however obliquely, in terms of harmony. Thomas Hobbes (1973) was convinced that 
absolutism alone could bring order to the state of nature resulting from the early modern 
Wars of Religion; the contract theorists (e.g. Mandeville 1995) insisted on the collective 
benefit generated by the actions of egoists pursuing their own interests; Emile Durkheim 
(1976) identified the common cognitive categories with what is collective in order to stress 
social integration; and Talcott Parsons (1964) postulated a shared system of values as the 
solution to the problem of social integration. These proposals for the conceptualisation of 
the quality pertaining to the constitution and organisation of society, however, have all 
been subjected to devastating criticisms.i Hobbes’ political one-sidedness was criticised 
from the perspective of constitutionalism; the blindness of the contract theorists to the 
social basis of contracts and the social costs of egoistic competition was exposed; it became 
apparent that Durkheim’s position rests on a confusion of the cognitive with the collective; 
and Parsons was taken to task precisely for his indefensible, indeed ideological, harmonious 
theory of society. What these criticisms suggest is that in the past social theorists did not 
grasp the precise status of the idea or, at least, the assumption of harmony and the role it 
plays in the human social form of life and theorising about it. The upshot of these rather 
truncated historical references, therefore, is that the social theorist should studiously reflect 
on the idea of harmony in order to become aware of its status and role both in social life 
and in social-scientific practice. 
  
The Idea of Harmony  
 
Harmony as an Element of the Cognitive Order 
Harmony is an aesthetic idea. It is the idea of a whole prior to its parts (Stadler 1968). As 
such, it gives the impression of a well-ordered, complete and perfect totality, the parts of 
which are measured against each other and against the whole. From one point of view, it is 
formal in the sense that it is an idea of the form of the object in question – in this case, the 
potential form of the emerging global society. From another point of view, it depends on the 
operation of the imagination in the sense that the formal whole is a projected one that does 
not correspond to anything actually existing. It is for this reason that it always has to be 
borne in mind that harmony is a vague aesthetic idea and not a precise analytical concept 
referring to a particular existent. 
 
It should be insisted, nevertheless, that harmony is one of a number of necessary and 
unavoidable ideas that play an indispensable role in social life and in social theory. However 
indeterminate and vague the aesthetic idea of harmony may be, it serves as a necessary 
assumption helping to provide a unifying vision without which we would lack the concept of 
society. Our intellectual analytical and reasoning faculties would be unable to operate, and 
we would be deprived of our ability to conceptually grasp society as both our world and our 
social scientific object of study, were we to be deprived of the input by the imagination of 
the idea of a well-ordered whole embracing its parts and thus lending coherence to them.ii 
The requirement of such an aesthetic input derives from the fact that we humans are 
intellectual beings who are simultaneously embodied, have minds based on brains uniquely 
characterised by the addition of the prefrontal cortex, live and act in a temporalised 
meaningful world, and therefore have to courageously confront problems while coping with 
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ontological insecurity and anxiety. In the contemporary period, the form of our object – that 
is to say, the very idea of harmony – is assuming the pronounced proportions it does, even 
to the extent of metamorphosing from a background assumption into a focus imaginarius, 
precisely because of the painfully experienced lack of fit between our aesthetic sense of a 
well-ordered whole and the actual disjointed state of both social and ecological relations. 
 
The idea of harmony forms a part of what I call ‘the cognitive order of society’ (Strydom 
2000, 2012c, 2013a and in press) – more particularly, part of the aesthetic or subjective 
sector rather than the objective and social sectors of the triply coded cognitive order. The 
cognitive order consists of a series of cognitive structures – of which harmony is but one 
element among many – that is necessary for the constitution of the human social form of 
life in so far as it makes communication and the formation of social relations in a material 
environment possible. Against actuality, it represents potentiality, including the temporally 
available or realisable possibilities. Analogous to a genomenology, it allows a wide range of 
combinations of its varied elements, including the idea of harmony, in the process of the 
generation of the texture of that form of life. This order of cognitive structures emerges 
from within society through practice-inspired reflexivity, backed up by phylogenetic and 
evolutionary consolidation, to occupy a meta-conventional level where it takes the form of 
abstract cognitive systems of principles which stimulate the generation, incursively structure 
and recursively regulate orientations, action, practices, interaction, discourse and 
institutionalisation. This is precisely the role of the idea of harmony, as one of the 
counterfactual components of the cognitive order, in social life – that is, ontologically – as 
well as in social theory – that is, epistemologically. 
 
The cognitive order in general, including the idea of harmony, is the outcome of a 
movement of ‘immanent transcendence’ (Habermas 1991; Honneth 2007; Strydom 2011b) 
or transcendence from within and, consequently, has the meta-level status of something 
virtual, something harbouring the potential of an incursive reconfiguration of actuality. This 
does not mean that it is something purely transcendent,iii least of all something 
transcendent that can be said to really exist and allows being made into a grandiose meta-
theory or realism of essential structures.iv To treat it as such would be tantamount to the 
ontological fallacy of reification or hypostatisation. This level of necessary self-organising 
suppositions, reflexive expectations, meta-conventional rules or counterfactual principles 
certainly does not admit of full realisation, since it is ‘unconditional’, ‘complex’ or, more 
fully, ‘determinably indeterminate’.v As implied by this latter expression which resonates 
with the concept of immanent transcendence, the cognitive order remains rooted 
immanently in social life. The cognitive order principles and, hence, the idea of harmony 
must therefore at all times be appreciated as standing in an inextricable relation with 
concrete social life – in the sense both of being generated by the process of the construction 
and organisation of society and, in turn, of having an indexing, structuring and regulating 
effect on the continuation of that process. 
 
This signals that the indeterminable transcendent idea of harmony, combined with a 
variable selection of other elements from the cognitive order (for instance, the ideas of 
freedom, equality, solidarity, rightness, autonomy, personal inviolability and so forth), 
acquires a palpably determinable form only immanently. In fact, it becomes refracted and 
embodied from different perspectives in the guise of a variety of distinct competing, 
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mutually contested and even conflicting, concretely pursued practices, each guided by a 
more or less specific culturally elaborated and articulated set of assumptions regarding the 
desired harmonious organisation of social life. Given the perspectival appropriation and 
activation in social life of the aesthetic idea of harmony embedded in the cognitive order, 
the social scientist has to follow the plurality of differences, the competing actor-agents, 
their conflicting practices and their mutually contradictory cultural frames or models of a 
harmonious society – in a nutshell, the varied local or context-immanent attempts to realise 
the context-transcendent idea of harmony in terms of corresponding actor- and group-level 
cognitive representations or models of a harmonious society. But rather than just following 
the actor-agents, it is vital that the structural level of the cognitive order as such is at all 
times kept in mind. The analytical specification beforehand of the presuppositions or 
reflexive expectations of the actor-agents in the form of the cognitive order 
counterfactuals structuring their orientations and actions is what enables the social 
analyst to discriminate variations and to determine which differences are significant.vi 
 
The Aesthetic Nature of the Idea of Harmony 
It is at this juncture of the acknowledgement of the demanding implications of the 
immanent-transcendence framework that a serious reflective question arises. It is the 
question of the precise understanding of the aesthetic nature of the idea of harmony. Since 
Aristotle’s (1963) isolation of the beginning-middle-end form, traditional aesthetics has 
consistently operated with the assumption of the aesthetic object as an organic or symbolic 
whole. This means that it was taken to represent a rounded, closed totality the parts of 
which cohere perfectly and are enveloped completely meaningfully by the whole. In the late 
eighteenth century, Kant (1972) canonically fixed this particular sense for modernity in his 
influential aesthetics. In the twentieth century, however, this idealistic symbolic conception 
of aesthetics had to make room for a very different non-organic allegorical conception 
articulated by authors like Bertolt Brecht, Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno, but 
particularly by the second of the three.vii If the aesthetic object still forms a whole, it is a 
unity that includes independent parts, some even with extra-aesthetic – for instance, 
political – significance, which integrate smoothly neither with the remaining parts nor with 
the whole. 
 
The point of this contrast is that to understand the idea of harmony in terms of traditional 
aesthetics would amount to taking it in an idealistic sense which is certain to vitiate any 
attempt at an adequate social scientific analysis. Following Benjamin’s aesthetics, it should 
rather be conceived in terms of a process of allegoresis, as it were. Once it is recognised that 
the idea of harmony forms part of the cognitive order of society, the danger of symbolic 
over-determination is averted. And once the cognitive order is understood as a meta-
conventional one which emerges through transcendence from within, the way is open for 
acknowledging that the counterfactual idea of harmony and its indexing, structuring and 
regulating effects can be appreciated only through its distinct concrete appropriations and 
uses in social life and their relations to one another. Only then, in other words, is the social 
scientist able to see the context-transcendent idea of harmony and the variety of context-
immanent, concretely pursued cultural models of the desired harmonious organisation of 
social life in relation to one another. This ‘continuously two-sided’, ‘stereoscopic’ or, rather, 
‘holographic’ approachviii drawing on the laser metaphor of a light wave being split into a 
reference beam and an accompanying beam carrying multidimensional information, is the 
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best option if the social scientist wishes to avoid the pitfalls of both idealism and empiricism 
– as he or she simply must. The reference to the form-giving cognitive order must be 
maintained at all times, while the plural range of lower level, cognitively framed positions 
and perspectives and their dynamics are simultaneously accommodated.ix 
 
‘Transformative Harmony’? 
 
The Cosmomorphic Approach 
The multidimensional social scientific vision outlined above brings us to the notion of 
‘transformative harmony’ (Giri 2012). The latter clearly implies a process directed and 
guided by the leading idea of harmony – an implication that points toward an expectation of 
the emergence of a harmonious global social order or social formation. Against this 
background, the question of the prospect of such an eventuality arises. Taking cues from 
contemporary social scientific thinking about globalisation, ecologism and cosmopolitanism, 
for instance, the typical predilection would seem to be to conceive of the emergence of a 
harmonious global order as an unfolding cosmomorphic process (Strydom 2011a) through 
which the realisation of the potential of the idea of harmony is achieved. The process is 
supposed to lead to and culminate in a single, all-encompassing harmonious society. Yet this 
understanding is in danger of reifying or hypostatising a counterfactual principle which does 
not now and never will correspond to anything existing. Reification or hypostatisation here 
means an essentialising tendency which assumes that culture is of such a nature that it 
could unify or homogenise society, indeed, that it could do so not merely in the case of a 
single society, but even across a range of societies. Reification or hypostatisation of this kind 
represents an illusion – here, the illusion that a harmonious social order could be attained at 
the global level through a shared culture. It is just not the case, however, that there is one 
single way in which the counterfactual idea of harmony has to or could be realised 
immanently. 
 
Considering assessments of the current global state of affairs, particularly the political-
economic organization of the world population, such a seemingly negative evaluation of the 
prospects of a harmonious global society could easily lead one to be taken in by a 
pessimistic mood. The current global order, a hierarchical order of structural and class 
dependencies, exhibits signs of deep divisions marked by pronounced asymmetrical power 
relations. The coordinated centre of gravity is occupied by the OECD countries which 
together with the south-east Asian states represent 16 per cent of the world population; the 
remaining 84 per cent divides among two internally fractured macro-states, China and India, 
with 37 per cent, 140 countries under limited state structures representing another 37 
percent, and finally a number of failing states housing 10 per cent of the world population. 
In development studies, the question prompted by this rather unpromising global situation, 
which is typically overlooked by the debates about global governance and cosmopolitanism, 
and probably also by those focusing on harmony, is: ‘Does peace have a future?’ (Senghaas 
2012). 
 
What this question suggests indeed seems like a more specific and thus a conceptually 
clearer and practically more directly relevant articulation of the very problematic intended 
by the concepts of harmony and transformative harmony. In any case, it is obvious that it 
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would be necessary for anyone intending to pursue analyses in terms of these latter 
concepts to take also research on peace, particularly the causes of peace, into account. 
 
The Cognitive Alternative 
Yet if one adopts a more appropriate and justifiable approach than the above-mentioned 
essentialising cosmomorphic one, for example a two-sided, stereoscopic or holographic 
cognitive approach, then one does not have to settle for a pessimistic stance. The advocacy 
and pursuit of a harmonious or, at least, a more harmonious society is by no means doomed 
from the outset. It is imperative, however, that one then recognises the precise level at 
which alone development in that direction is possible. But this has the effect, to be sure, of 
intensifying the question of whether the idea of harmony would be the most appropriate 
focus imaginarius for contemporary society and social theory. 
 
At the very centre of the attainment of a harmonious society is a learning process or, rather, 
a set of related learning processes. Considered from the inside rather than simply observing 
from the outside, the process of the constitution and organisation of society is equivalent to 
a multidimensional learning process.x Any learning process, and certainly this 
multidimensional one, is given form and shape by a range of cognitive structures of different 
levels and scales. At the micro end, the process is structured by actor-agents’xi assumptions, 
expectations, orientations and schemata which are based on the human cognitive capacities 
and competences. At the opposite macro end, the process is incursively structured and 
recursively regulated by reflexive presuppositions or expectations qua counterfactual 
principles forming part of the cognitive order of society. In between, the physical and social 
structures of the immanent context condition the learning processes of the multiplicity of 
individuals so that they consolidate into a range of more or less sharply differing collective 
actor-agents, each of whom through learning in turn constructs its own particular cognitive 
schema, frame or model of a harmonious society. It is through the interrelation, 
competition, mutual contestation and even conflict of these collective frames, especially in 
the public sphere but not only there, that societally significant learning processes are 
generated. At the outset of the interrelation, a temporary short-term window emerges for 
selection from the generated variety and decision-making that creates the basis for 
institutionalisation and organisation by giving rise to a more enduring epi-level cultural 
model.xii The consequent result of the expansion, alignment and fusion of collective frames 
is thus typically an adumbrated or newly emergent cultural model consisting of a cognitive 
core and a semantic or symbolic outer layer, implying a more or less significant spurt of 
societal learning which could be accompanied by an evolutionary drift or even a shift in one 
or more components of the cognitive order. 
 
It is apparent that the constitution and organisation of a harmonious society requires a 
series of interconnected multilevel learning processes of the kind described above – 
processes in and through which not just individuals and groups or collectives, but also 
society or societies undergo and experience re-framings or reconfigurations of their 
respective frames or sets of cognitive structures (Eder 1999; Strydom 1999b, 2000, 2002, 
2009). Considering the nature of the process of the constitution and organisation of society, 
however, what obviously raises doubts about the viability of the idea of harmony as a 
potential leading focus imaginarius for our time is the fact that no learning can occur 
without the dynamising effect of the variety generated by competition, contestation and 
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even conflict. How could harmony be reconciled with such a dynamic force? Is harmony not 
a processual outcome, an effect of such a dynamic process? It seems, therefore, as though 
the attainment of a harmonious society would be better served by the selection of a set of 
leading ideas, ones compatible with the competing practices of the generation of variety, 
instead of adopting the single idea of harmony and attempting its direct realisation. Rather 
than a one-dimensional cosmomorphic approach, a multileveled dynamic one is clearly 
required for the analysis and understanding of the process of the constitution and 
organisation of the nascent global society. 
  
It should be stressed, however, that there can be no doubt about the fact that the idea of 
harmony forms an inextricable part of the cognitive order of contemporary society. And 
given the basic human orientation towards meaning and coherence, the cognitive frames of 
all individuals and collective actor-agents must necessarily contain some assumption or 
other about harmony. The idea of harmony and both individual and collective assumptions 
about harmony thus undoubtedly enter in varied ways into the learning processes at the 
core of the constitution and organisation of the emerging global society. However, 
considering the series of culturally borne cognitive developments characteristic of the late 
twentieth century that have been and still are being spearheaded by individual and 
collective actor-agents who are not afraid of competition, contestation and even conflict, it 
seems as though such guiding lights as ecologism, cosmopolitanism and the related 
constructions of peace and human rights would be better suited to the pursuit of a 
harmonious global society. In any case, a single cognitive idea together with a corresponding 
normative cultural model is not necessary, if viable at all, for the cultivation of harmony and 
the eventual attainment of a harmonious society. A global cosmopolitan existence 
embedded in a cared-for planetary biosocial ecosphere in which human rights are observed 
and a stable peace prevails would be equivalent to a harmonious society – but, to be sure, a 
harmonious society that would require constant reconstitution and elaboration in 
accordance with changing conditions in which competition, contestation and conflict, 
preferably discursive conflict, guided by a variety of creatively combined leading ideas 
would be a necessary element of its driving force and dynamics. 
 
Ecologism, cosmopolitanism, peace and human rights, while drawing on a variety of 
components of the context-transcendent cognitive order, have the advantage that they 
have already been elaborated into relatively enduring, context-immanent, epi-level cultural 
models. It is quite possible to reconstruct the historical construction of each of these 
cultural models with reference to the contributing actor-agents and publics, the medium of 
communication embracing both interaction and discourse in and through which it was 
achieved, the contextual conditions under which this occurred, and the structuring elements 
from the cognitive order which entered into its make-up. Rather than simply vague meta-
level or even metaphysical ideas beyond the context, therefore, they have been immanently 
incorporated to form part of a penumbra of cultural models around (epi) the situation on 
which actor-agents can and do in fact directly draw. Their cognitive cores deriving from the 
cognitive order are encapsulated by a semantic or symbolic layer that infuses them with 
evaluative and normative significance which renders them communicable and thus 
immanently or situationally relevant. These epi-level cultural models are all concrete, 
situation-specific embodiments of selective combinations of meta-level cognitive ideas 
emitting significance effects which do not simply correspond to, but actually take up into 
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themselves and incursively and recursively structure the expectations entertained by 
individuals and groups (Strydom 2012b). 
 
The attainment of a harmonious society depends on the diffusion of these potent cultural 
models in all local or immanent contexts through communicatively mediated learning 
processes that reconfigure individual, group or collective and societal cognitive structures. 
This is where the social sciences can make a unique contribution – if only they prove capable 
of taking the cognitive revolution seriously in their own terms.xiii The learning processes 
involved need to be theoretically clarified and for this purpose the many available concrete 
examples call for substantive investigation and close analysis. Theoretical and substantive 
advances could and indeed do link up with existing practical efforts, such as for example 
those carried by cultural and social movements, and could become the basis for furthering 
the practical advocacy and pursuit of the project of a harmonious society over a wide front, 
including in the most unlikely local nooks and crannies. Such a varied and multipronged 
cognitive approach is precisely what is needed to bring the cognitive idea and normative 
vision of harmony into sharper focus and to strengthen the concern with its realisation in 
the here and now – with potential spin-off effects of helping to generate a harmonious 
global society. What has to be appreciated, to highlight a crucial point, is that a harmonious 
global society cannot be the direct outcome of learning processes, whether relative to 
ecologism, cosmopolitanism, peace, human rights or even harmony, since it falls in the 
domain of phylogenetic and evolutionary structure formation. In turn, of course, such 
structure formation is nevertheless vitally dependent on the emergent properties generated 
by the whole array of constructive activities and learning processes. This latter rider 
indicates unequivocally where the responsibility of the social scientist lies today. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
However critical the reflections on the idea of harmony may be perceived to be, nothing 
that was written in the above detracts from the project of a harmonious global society. On 
the contrary, the argument is intentionally aimed at theoretical clarification aspiring to 
make matters precise enough for constructive engagement in the theoretical and practical 
pursuit of that goal. 
  
 
                                                          
Notes 
 
i Criticisms of Hobbes and the contract theorists were developed by a host of authors during 
the early modern period who responded to their publications. Hobbes’ absolutism was 
attacked in particular by the so-called ‘Monarchomachi’, that is to say, those against the 
absolutist monarchy – on which see Strydom (2000). Mandeville who provocatively restated 
the central tenet of contract theory was opposed by the contract theorists’ most innovative 
and influential critic, Giambattista Vico (1970). Piaget (1983) already perceived Durkheim’s 
confusion, but it has become clearly apparent only recently in the wake of the cognitive 
revolution of the late 1950s and the associated cognitive turn in sociology – for instance, 
Thévenot (1998) and Strydom (2013a). Mainstream sociology is yet to appreciate this. 
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Parsons’ theory received critical treatment by a number of authors like David Lockwood, C. 
Wright Mills, Ralf Dahrendorf and Alain Touraine in the context of the functionalist debate 
of the 1950s and 1960s, but it was Habermas (1988) who explicitly attacked his harmonious 
theory. 
ii Kant (1968) demonstrated the need for general concepts; it was a central assumption of 
the left-Hegelian tradition represented by Marx (1967) and Peirce (1998). Against this 
background, this insight still has a subterranean presence in both European and American 
social theory to this very day; for instance, the importance of general concepts is assumed 
by neo-institutionalists such as Powell and DiMaggio (1991), while Boltanski (2011) notes 
their importance both for social actors and for social scientists. The recognition of their role 
is central to critical theory’s basic concept of ‘immanent transcendence’, on which see 
Strydom (2011b). It is crucial to appreciate, however, that it is not simply semantic 
generality that is at issue here, but especially cognitive universality – on which see for 
instance Strydom (2015) with reference to Habermas (1996). 
iii Objecting to the later Parsons’ appeal to what he called the ‘telic system’, Habermas 
(1987: 256) writes as follows: ‘there are no indicators accessible to social-theoretical 
analysis for a transcendence that is independent…from the communicative practice of 
human beings…’ 
iv Archer, who serves on a Vatican committee, represents this kind of realism in respect of 
what she calls ‘the Cultural System’, which is written in capital letters for that very reason. 
For a recent statement, see Archer and Dave Elder-Vass (2012). 
v According to Habermas (2003: 99), this potentiating penumbra of reflexive suppositions is 
in principle ‘unconditional’ and, according to Luhmann (1995: 24), it is ‘complex’ in so far as 
‘the concept is applicable to what is not system…[which means – PS]…(environment, 
world)…’; but Husserl (1950: 101) is still more precise when he characterizes this ‘horizon’ as 
a matter of ‘determinable indeterminacy’, implying that for practical purposes or in the 
course of concrete social life particular selections can, and indeed must, be made from the 
available potentialities, but that no selection can ever exhaust the potentiality it is drawing 
upon. 
vi The specification of the relevant cognitive order principles is achieved through the 
methodological procedure of ‘reconstruction’, on which see Strydom (2011b). 
vii Brecht originally introduced the distinction between the organic and non-organic work of 
art in his Arbeitsjournal (Bürger 1981: 127) which served as the basis of the alienation effect 
he sought to transmit by way of his ‘epic theatre’ – on which see Brecht (1979). His close 
associate, Benjamin (1963), influentially elaborated and applied the idea in the form of the 
distinction between symbol and allegory – with the emphasis on the latter. Adorno (1970) 
similarly regarded the non-organic or allegorical concept of aesthetics as being most 
appropriate to the authentic modern art of the twentieth century. 
viii Husserl (1969: 263) speaks of a type of ‘continuously two-sided research’; Habermas 
(1996: 19, 21, 69 and 79) describes what he regards as a ‘stereoscopic’ sociological 
procedure; and, basing herself on David Bohm, Adam (1994: 158-60) offers an account of 
holography. 
ix This methodological perspective is characteristic of the cognitive approach properly 
conceived. It is rooted in what may be called the cognitive problematic: that something 
belonging to the world is nevertheless able to distinguish itself from the world, to develop a 
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perspective on the world, and to establish a relation with the world – on which see Strydom 
(2011b, 2011c and 2012a). 
x On learning, see: Eder (1982, 1996, 1999); Miller (1986, 2002); Strydom (1987, 2008 and 
2009); and Trenz and Eder (2004). 
xi I employ the concept of ‘actor-agent’ in order to account for both consciousness and the 
unconscious which are given with the possession of both cognitive competences and 
dormant or merely operative capacities. Typically, social theorists cut the human member of 
society in half by opting either for action theory or for system or structural theory.  
xii The process of construction in which the cognitive and the symbolic are fused so as to 
give rise to a cultural model is captured under the title of ‘triple contingency’ in Strydom 
(1999a, 2009, 2012a and 2013b). Leydesdorff (2009) has added some clarity to this process 
in the course of his formalisation of the concept; see also Leydesdorff (2008). Russill (2004) 
has employed the concept to interpret Dewey’s theory of public communication, and on the 
basis of his contribution the doyen of American communication theory, Robert Craig (2006), 
has incorporated it into his disciplinary field.   
xiii Strydom (2007) offers a cartographic overview of the parameters within which the 
cognitive turn currently seems to be possible for the social sciences. 
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